ATSIC Review: Background and information

[NOTE: The ATSIC Review was completed in Nov 2003]

[Download a Word version of this document]

ATSIC Review Final Report [PDF]

Further information

Background

ATSIC was created amidst much controversy and opposition in 1990, replacing the Commonwealth Department of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA) and the Aboriginal Development Commission (ADC). Its structure is unique, combining roles as the principal advisor on Indigenous policy to the Commonwealth Government and supplementary deliverer Indigenous programs and services, with a representative role as the peak national elected Indigenous body and advocate for Indigenous rights.

Until recent changes (see below) ATSIC consisted of an elected arm (the Board and Regional Councils) and an administrative arm to manage ATSIC's programs.

ATSIC has always operated within a "climate of criticism" substantially based on misconceptions about ATSIC's responsibilities, particularly with respect to its accountability, funding and delivery of services. Before the recent changes, ATSIC administered only around half of the Commonwealth's total expenditure on Indigenous affairs, most of which was mandated by the Commonwealth for specific programs, such as CDEP. Only a small proportion of ATSIC's spending was discretionary. In addition, ATSIC did not have responsibility for policy areas it has been widely criticised for, particularly in health, education, employment, domestic violence and incarceration rates.

ATSIC regarded the current review established in November 2002, as an opportunity in part to "address the systemic ignorance in some areas of government, mainstream media and in the wider community about what ATSIC was established to do and what it was not".

In April 2003, Minister Philip Ruddock pre-empted the Review process by announcing interim changes to ATSIC, removing its responsibilities for administering programs and making funding decisions, and transferring these responsibilities to a new agency, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Services (ATSIS).

ATSIS is part of the Commonwealth's Department of Indigenous Affairs under Minister Ruddock. It began operations on 1st July 2003. Most of ATSIC's administrative arm staff were transferred to the new executive agency. ATSIC retained a small number of staff to service its elected arm.

The changes in effect remove direct control over ATSIC's budget from its elected arm.

The government's stated purpose was to clearly distinguish roles within ATSIC to address perceptions of conflict of interest and to remove the potential for actual conflicts of interest in decision-making over funding. However, it provided no evidence of systemic conflict of interest within ATSIC.

The ATSIC Board has agreed in principle with the creation of ATSIS as an interim measure while awaiting the outcome of the review, but is deeply unhappy with the way it has been done.

Meanwhile, the review process is continuing, with the Review Panel releasing its Public Discussion Paper. The Review Panel was asked to examine the current roles and functions of ATSIC including advocacy and representation, programs and services, and advice on implementation of legislation, and to explore opportunities for more effective arrangements for ATSIC at the regional and national level.

The Discussion Paper points out (4.5)

'After more than 12 years, ATSIC has reached a crisis point in respect of its public credibility and with its indigenous constituency. Great concern is being expressed that this is spilling over from ATSIC and adversely impacting on other areas such as the reconciliation movement. A concerted effort is required to reposition ATSIC as a positive force for indigenous advancement; otherwise it will become irrelevant or face abolition.'

The Discussion Paper outlines a number of options for reform of ATSIC, and identifies four possible future models.

Key points for submissions:

The following are key points for submissions - statements you might include, or elaborate upon, in a letter to the review panel. These focus on the principles and appropriate processes which should guide and be supported by the Review Panel, rather than specific recommendations for change, which we see as matters for Indigenous people themselves to determine.

  1. Any changes to ATSIC need to be determined in consultation and negotiation with Indigenous stakeholders, particularly the current elected arm of ATSIC, and on the basis of their informed consent. The Review Panel's final report should provide a strong endorsement of this principle.

  2. ATSIC should remain as the peak national elected body in Indigenous affairs with primary roles in representation and advocacy, including internationally.

  3. ATSIC should retain its role as the principal source of Indigenous policy advice to government.

  4. ATSIC should continue its role in funding and service provision for Indigenous-specific services.

  5. Self-determination principles must underpin ATSIC's structure and roles, including the principle of Indigenous control of policy and programs affecting Indigenous peoples.

  6. A separation of powers mechanism with regard to funding decisions should be implemented under a single ATSIC structure.

  7. ATSIC should have a defined role to provide advice on mainstream policy and service delivery by government departments and agencies at a national as well as state and territory level, and in monitoring the performance of those agencies to agreed standards and benchmarks.

  8. With regard to the models proposed in the Discussion Paper, it is important that Indigenous stakeholders determine what is appropriate for their needs. Changes to ATSIC's structure must be negotiated with the elected ATSIC representatives.

  9. There appears to be strong Indigenous support, including from ATSIC itself, for an enhanced role for regional bodies, including a regional planning role.

  10. The Review Panel final report should express a view on the ongoing implications of the 'climate of criticism' and widespread misconceptions about ATSIC, and the need for effective measures to address this.

Additional information on key points:

1. Any changes to ATSIC need to be determined in consultation and negotiation with Indigenous stakeholders, particularly the current elected arm of ATSIC, and on the basis of their informed consent. The Review Panel's final report should provide a strong endorsement of this principle.

This is in line with the principles of self-determination.

In addition, if concerns about ATSIC from within the Indigenous community are a significant reason for the need for change, as suggested in the discussion paper, then of paramount importance is that future changes are seen to have come from a proper and transparent process of negotiation with and consent from Indigenous stakeholders.

Changes made without Indigenous consent are unlikely to be effective and in fact, are likely to be counter-productive in that these would lack the support of and 'ownership' by the Indigenous community. The reformed body would begin with a significant handicap.

2. ATSIC should remain as the peak national elected body in Indigenous affairs with primary roles in representation and advocacy, including internationally.

The importance of ATSIC as an Indigenous-controlled, representative body that advocates on behalf of Indigenous Australians is widely recognised and supported. Loss of such a body would represent a massive step backwards in Indigenous affairs policy.

3. ATSIC should retain its role as the principal source of Indigenous policy advice to government.

If ATSIC is to have a meaningful role in supporting Indigenous self-management and self-determination, then it must retain its role as the principal source of policy advice to government.

In this regard it is of concern that in recent years ATSIC's influence in providing policy advice has been seriously undermined, not least by the federal government itself. This has included the establishment of a separate Office of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (OATSIA) within the Minister's Department, which is increasingly relied upon by the Minister for advice. There has also been a significant decline in ATSIC's input and access to the Cabinet policy development process. (D.P 5.3 - see Chapter 5 for Policy issues).

In these respects, Minister Ruddock needs to demonstrate he is serious about strengthening ATSIC's role and influence in providing policy advice.

(See also point 7 below)

4. ATSIC should continue its role in funding and service provision for Indigenous-specific services.

There is an ongoing need for Indigenous-specific service delivery programs that address the particular cultural and community needs of Indigenous people and which supplement mainstream services which have a poor record in terms of Indigenous access, particularly in remote areas.

In keeping with the principles of Indigenous control of programs affecting Indigenous peoples, such programs should be the responsibility of ATSIC rather than mainstream government departments.

5. Self-determination principles must underpin ATSIC's structure and roles, including the principle of Indigenous control of policy and programs affecting Indigenous peoples.

Self-determination is both an internationally recognised right of Indigenous peoples and a practical necessity in terms of addressing disadvantage and providing a secure economic future for Indigenous communities.

Dr Bill Jonas' 2002 Social Justice Report notes that self-determination

is a process of negotiation, accommodation and participation. Importantly, it is also about Indigenous peoples accepting responsibility and governments removing the controlling hand in order to ensure that such acceptance is meaningful and has consequences.

6. A separation of powers mechanism with regard to funding decisions should be implemented under a single ATSIC structure.

The creating of the separate agency, ATSIS, to control funding decisions, was a retrograde move made without evaluation of the efficacy of the change, or evidence that a 'separation of powers' could not have been better achieved under the existing ATSIC structure. The Minister seems to suggest that negotiations with ATSIC over the issue were positive and progressing (although apparently not quickly enough for the Minister) begging the question as to why a unilateral, pre-emptive change was necessary.

It effectively undermines Indigenous self-determination and marginalises ATSIC as a representative voice by removing responsibility for funding decisions from the elected ATSIC Board and Regional Councils and placing it under Minister Ruddock's Department of Indigenous Affairs.

Already there are indications that, despite Mr Ruddock's assurances, the interim ATSIS agency is acting inappropriately in attempting to influence the activities of Indigenous bodies it is funding (for instance, to prevent advocacy on rights issues).

This is alarming, and raises the perception that the Minister's actions in establishing ATSIS were not made with the best interests of ATSIC in mind. A mechanism is urgently needed to ensure that ATSIS acts strictly in conformity with ATSIC's policies and priorities.

7. ATSIC should have a defined role to provide advice on mainstream policy and service delivery by government departments and agencies at a national as well as state and territory level, and in monitoring the performance of those agencies to agreed standards and benchmarks.

The Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC) report on Indigenous Funding 2001, and the Productivity Commission Review of Government Service Provision have shown that Indigenous people are poorly served by mainstream services. The CGC report highlighted the problems in mainstream service-delivery caused by our complex federal system and the need for "the full and effective participation of Indigenous people in decisions affecting funding distribution and service delivery".

It is important that ATSIC, as the peak Indigenous body and with its structure of Regional Councils, be directly involved in providing advice to departments and government agencies at all levels, on the provision of mainstream services to Indigenous people.

Commonwealth, state and territory government agencies need to work with ATSIC to deliver better and more coordinated services, which will be informed by and undertake activities consistent with ATSIC Regional plans. This will also require the development of national benchmarks and standards to address Indigenous disadvantage and against which to measure outcomes (see DP 6.58).

8. With regard to the models proposed in the Discussion Paper, it is important that Indigenous stakeholders determine what is appropriate for their needs. Changes to ATSIC's structure must be negotiated with the elected ATSIC representatives.

While it is understandable that a range of models or options were proposed in the Discussion Paper, it is the views of Indigenous stakeholders, and particularly the elected arm of ATSIC, which are paramount in determining future options for change.

9. There appears to be strong Indigenous support, including from ATSIC itself, for an enhanced role for regional bodies, including a regional planning role.

Again, this is an issue which needs to be determined by Indigenous people themselves and in fact has been considered by ATSIC at a national and regional level. ATSIC's submission to the Review supports the need for an enhanced role for regional bodies.

10. The Review Panel final report should express a view on the ongoing implications of the 'climate of criticism' and widespread misconceptions about ATSIC, and the need for effective measures to address this.

The Discussion Paper acknowledges the debilitating impact of negative perceptions about ATSIC. Both the Review Panel and the Minister acknowledge that change is being considered at least partly because of negative perceptions about ATSIC rather than empirical evidence of systemic problems with its structure or operations. We also know that governments have exploited such misconception as a smokescreen for their own policy and service delivery failures. What guarantee is there that such unwarranted and in some cases fabricated criticism will not continue to fatally undermine any new structure established?

The Review Panel should address these issues, including the need for effective measures to address them.

A Short Response for busy people

The Review Panel is to be commended for their work in consulting and synthesising submissions from over 50 respondents, Indigenous and non-Indigenous individuals, communities and organisations, into the Discussion Paper.

It appears to be free of any preconceptions as to preferred outcomes, and presents a range of possible options for reform.

In the final report, it is to be hoped that proposals for a 'new ATSIC' retain ATSIC as the peak national elected body in Indigenous affairs with primary roles in representation and advocacy, including internationally. ATSIC should also retain its role as the principal source of Indigenous policy advice to government and should continue its role in funding and service provision for Indigenous-specific services.

Finally, any changes to ATSIC need to be determined in consultation and negotiation with Indigenous stakeholders, particularly the current elected arm of ATSIC, and on the basis of their informed consent. The Review Panel's final report should provide a strong endorsement of this principle.

Additional information

ATSIC Review website

ANTaR's submission to the Review Panel's public discussion paper

For background information on ATSIC and its history see the following brief from the Parliamentary Library: www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/CIB/2002-03/03cib29.pdf

 

Australians for Native Title and Reconciliation (ANTaR)  • www.antar.org.au
 Home   Media  •  Action    Issues  • Sea of Hands  • Contact  • Top